German pension politics
Analyses of German pension politics were often purely institutionalist in the past decades, dealing with issues such as path dependency, incrementalism, reform deadlock or the joint decision trap. Then, the 2001 Riester reform posed a major challenge to these explanations, and actors had to be incorporated into the explanations. Yet some more recent papers argue that the interplay of rational actors and institutions must be enriched by a cognitive component, i.e. actors' belief systems, learning behavior and welfare discourse.
My dissertation project on German pension politics tries to bridge the gap between the three approaches. It explores the interaction between belief coalitions and external events in German pension politics since the mid-1990s in a longitudinal perspective. Specifically, the analysis seeks to show whether changes in advocacy coalitions are a prerequisite for pension reforms and/or changes in government composition or whether they are consequences of these events.
The analysis differentiates between innovative versus incremental reforms as well as different legislative periods with different institutional configurations. On the other hand, belief coalitions are rigorously measured using content analysis and quantitative social network analysis. Using the software Discourse Network Analyzer, it is thus possible to test the widespread assertion that major changes in the power configuration of ideational coalitions are responsible for major policy change in the policy domain of old-age provision in Germany. As an additional component of the analysis, the political discourse on pension reform will be examined, and changes will be measured in a quantitative way.
More details will be provided as soon as something has been presented or published. If you are interested in further details, please do not hesitate to send me an e-mail!